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This paper considers the economic nature of the scholarly journal from a theoretical perspective 
and concludes that it. is what economists call a natural monopoly. Natural monopolies e~is~ 
wh~ the average p;zce of the good falls over the range of demand, and unless a subsidy is 
provided the good will not be produced in the quantity that provides the most social benefit. The 
natur~l monopoly model of t~e scholarly journal sheds light on the issue of dual pricing and 
explains how scholarly publishing can be a highly profitable enterprise. Because subsidies 
should be easier to implement in electronic systems, this alternative may provide a more effec-
tive means of scholarly communication. 
ibrarians and the publishers of 
scholarly journals have a long 
history of disagreement over 
prices. Librarians feel ex-
ploited, and publishers misunderstood. 
Neither side seems to be able to see the 
other's point of view .1 This lack of com-
prehension occurs~ at least in part, be-
cause librarians are not knowledgeable 
about the economics of scholarly journal 
publishing. If librarians are to make rea-
soned and reasonable policy decisions on 
the distribution of scholarly information, 
the situation must change. The scholarly 
journal is only one means of distributing 
scholarship, but if we understand its eco-
nomics,. we can apply our insights across 
the board. This article will explore the eco-
nomics of the scholarly journal and along 
the way will consider dual pricing and the 
changes electronic systems may bring. 
We will begin by examining the schol-
arly journal's production characteristics 
and the nature of the scholarly journal's 
demand as a product in the marketplace. 
To do so, we will use a simple example to 
explore these characteristics and the inter-
play that results among libraries, scholars 
and publishers. As is the case whenever 
simple models are used to portray a com-
plex reality, some. of the detail and texture 
will be lost, but in compensation we will 
be given the opportunity to see clearly re-
lationships that might otherwise elude us. 
SUPPLY 
Different goods are made in different 
ways. To describe the differences, econo-
mists develop production functions that 
explain how, for the particular product, 
inputs are turned into outputs. The pro-
duction function for scholarly journals is 
twofold. There is a large, up-front fixed 
cost-what publishers call the ufirst copy 
cost." This expenditure is necessary to se-
lect and edit articles, to lay out pages, and 
to maintain subscription lists and a distri-
bution system. It must be paid regardless 
of how many copies of the journal are 
sold. The cost of printing and distributing 
each unit after these setup costs have been 
paid is relatively small. Let us assume for 
our example that the fixed costs for a year 
, of production of a hypothetical journal are 
$10,000 and that the per-unit costs are $10 
per subscription. The total cost of produc-
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ing between 10 and 1,000 units of this jour-
nal are shown in table 1. Also shown are 
the average cost-the total cost divided by 
the number of subscriptions-and the 
marginal cost. The marginal cost is the ad-
ditional cost of producing one more unit of 
output; in our example, the marginal cost 
is for printing and distribution and is al-
ways $10. The same information is shown 
graphically in figure 1. Note that the aver-
age cost drops rapidly as the volume of 
production increases; the more units pro-
duced, the closer we come to the relatively 
low marginal cost. But the average cost 
never falls below the marginal cost. The 
importance of this attribute of the produc-
tion function will become clear shortly. 
DEMAND 
Scholarly journals have two ~arkets, li-
braries and individuals. These markets 
differ in important ways. Libraries are 
generally willing to pay more than indi-
viduals for journals. They are also less 
likely to place or cancel their subscriptions 
because of changes in prices, and price, al-
though a consideration, is rarely the pri-
mary factor in determining whether to 
purchase a title. Usually a library will de-
cide which journals are important and 
purchase as many of them as it can afford. 
Once a subscription has been placed it is 
usually continued without serious review 
unless there is a fiscal crisis. When prices 
rise libraries will cancel a subscription 
only hesitantly, even when this means 
buying fewer books or making other 
budget cuts. For libraries, price changes 
have relatively little effect on purchasing 
behavior. 2 In the language of economics, 
library demand for scholarly journals is in-
elastic. An often-cited textbook example 
of inelastic demand is kidney dialysis. Li-
braries, like the kidney patient, may com-
plain about prices, but they pay them 
nonetheless. 
Another important aspect of library de-
mand is the limited substitutability be-
tween scholarly journals. foreign Affairs, 
Orbis, and Foreign Policy are all important 
journals covering international relations, 
but a library will rarely substitute one for 
the other solely on the basis of price. From 
the library's point of view, these three ti-
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ties are differentgoods. Importantly, this 
implies that in the library market scholarly 
journals are monopoly goods and pub-
lishers have monopoly power. As Edward 
Dyl deftly points out, all publishers of 
copyrighted works are monopolists.3 This 
view is, however, simplistic. The titles 
noted are distinct goods not because they 
are copyrighted, but because academic li-
brary users, especially faculty members, 
who have much to say in these matters, 
will not generally accept an article from 
Orbis when what they seek is an article 
from Foreign Affairs. This point is critical. 
One can argue as Malcolm Getz has that 
''the possibility of new titles by other pub-
lishers entering the journal marketplace 
defines an upper limit on journal prices. " 4 
New scholarly journals do enter the mar-
ket and in some cases they replace other 
scholarly journals. But it is my contention 
that the general case is more like the one 
that Getz goes on to describe: ""To the ex-
tent that a particular title achieves a dis-
tinctive editorial position and reputation 
for important essays ... new entrants 
may pose little threat.' '5 Sandra Moline 
found a large variance in journal prices, 
even when the number of characters pub-
lished was considered.6 These findings, 
which at first may seen puzzling, are eas-
ily understood when scholarly journals 
are seen as monopoly goods. The impor-
tant point is that for scholarly journals, 
reputation and distinctive editorial posi-
tion, once gained, are lost very slowly. It is 
this fact that makes them distinct goods 
and provides their publishers with mo-
nopoly power. 
Popular journals are different. For ex-
ample, a library might decide to subscribe 
to one magazine about Macintosh com-
puters; it could be MacUser1 MacWeek,or 
MACazine. Price will probably be an im-
portant factor, and should the chosen title 
suddenly double in price, there would be 
little hesitancy in canceling that title and 
subscribing to a cheaper one. Here there is 
substitution, even of copyrighted mate-
rial, and elastic demand. What results is a 
more competitive market that relies on ad-
vertising to help finance publication. 
Individuals, at least in part because li-
braries provide them with an alternative 
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to ownership, have lower limits of the top 
price they are willing to pay for a journal; 
they are more likely to adjust their pur-
chases when prices change. Individual de-
mand for scholarly journals is more elastic 
than the library demand. 7 
For the sake of our example; let us as-
sume that in the library market there are 
250 possible subscribers and the ?1ost ~y 
of them is willing to pay for our 1oumal 1s 
$250 per year. To make things easy we will 
assume that the demand is linear func-
tion. The equation for this function will be 
quantity purchased by libraries = 
250 - price charged libraries 
This· is the function that describes the line 
ABC in figure 2. If we similarly assume 
that there are 750 possible individual sub-
scribers and that the most any one of them 
would be willing to pay is $25 per yearJ 
and that once again the demand is a linear 
function, personal demand could be rep-
resented by the function 
quantity purchased by individuals = 
750 - (30 x price charged individuals) 
This is the equation for line DE in figure 2. 
H we combine the two demand curves to 
find the demand for the total market,, we 
will have a curve that is linear but that has 
an elbow. Above a price of $25, the curve 
is the library demand curve since above 
$25 no individuals will purchase the jour-
nal. Below $25, the library and personal 
demand curves must be added together. 
The combined demand function is 
if price is greater than $25, the!1 
quantity purchased = 250 - pnce 
if price is less than or equal to $25, th~n 
quantitypurchased = 1,000 - (31 x pnce) 
This is the equation for line ABF in figure 
2. 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
When we bring together the supply and 
demand curves, we can begin to under-
stand the nature of the scholarly journal 
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market. This is shown in figure 3. In a 
competitive market, an equilibrium is es-
tablished at the point where the marginal 
cost curve intersects the demand curve. At 
this point, the cost of production will be 
equal to the willingness of the consumer 
to pay. This results in marginal cost pric-
ing. The amount produced at this point is 
the efficient quantity and the price 
charged is the efficient price. Production 
at this point and at this price provides the 
greatest benefit to society. In our example.1 
with a marginal cost of $10, the demand 
will be 690 subscriptions. There is, how-
ever, a problem. At this point the revenue 
from selling 690 subscriptions will be 
$6, 900-$10 per subscription times the 690 
subscribers. The cost of producing this 
number of subscriptions will be $16, 900-
the $10, 000 fixed costs and the $10 variable 
cost times 690. There will be a loss to the 
publisher of $10,000. 
Economists call this situation a natural 
monopoly. A natural monopoly occurs 
when the average cost falls over the entire 
range of demand; it is a common occur-
rence where there are large up-front costs, 
low per-unit costs, and limited substitut-
ability. This is the case for scholarly jour-
nals. An important implication of a natu-
ral monopoly is that, without a subsidy, 
no for-profit firm will undertake the publi-
cation of the journal and price it at mar-
ginal cost. In fact, even if a price above 
marginal price is charged, there will be a 
loss. For example, if the subscription price 
were $20, there would be 380 subscrip-
tions, revenuesof$7,600, costs of$13,800, 
and a loss of $6,200. A profit can be made, 
but only ·at a price where the average cost 
curve is above the demand curve. In our 
example this break-even point is a sub-
scription price of $64 and 186 subscribers. 
This is a long way from the efficient price 
and the efficient quantity. 
The fact that scholarly journals are natu-
ral monopolies explains a great deal. We 
see why there is a strong incentive to keep 
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the up-front costs low and to find ways to 
subsidize publication. To do this, editors 
volunteer their time and authors are not 
paid for their efforts. Both editors and au-
thors are willing to undertake this free la-
bor because, in addition to contributing to 
knowledge, they assume a long-term in-
crease in academic reputations. The pres-
sure to keep costs low may also limit the 
number of pages that can be published, 
which may in turn lead to more rigorous 
review and acceptance policies. Finally, if 
wide distribution is the goal, a way to sub-
sidize publication must be found; often 
support comes from an academic institu-
tion or scholarly society. ff not, the short-
fall can be made up by accepting advertis-
ing. What is important to understand is 
that the nature of the production and the 
demand for scholarly journals creates this 
situation. Publishers' greed is not the fun-
damental cause, although as we shall see 
later, there are opportunities for the 
greedy to exploit the situation. 
It is important to avoid another fallacy. 
Inelastic library demand is not all that 
causes high journal prices; it is the interac-
tion of this demand function with the pro-
duction function of the scholarly journal. 
Even if libraries somehow managed to 
change the nature of their demand so that 
it was more elastic, scholarly journal 
prices would not come down; rather, jour-
nals would go out of business. Because 
scholarly journals are natural monopolies, 
they require subsidies if they are to pro-
duce at the efficient quantity. 8 Without the 
inelastic library market, they would not be 
published at all. The important and diffi-
cult question is how best to provide the re-
quired subsidy. 
SURPLUS AS A MEASURE 
OF SOCIAL BENEFIT 
Before going on, we need to better un-
derstand natural monopolies. One might 
suspect that natural monopolies, which 
price at marginal cost, would be rare be-
cause no profit can be made. Why would 
we want or even accept a price and pro-
duction level at the efficient quantity? 
Why would we want a venture that al-
ways operates at a loss? The answer is sim-
ple: not all the benefit gained is measured 
November 1989 
by the profit or loss of the producer. We all 
understand this and have little trouble 
supporting, with our tax dollars, public 
works projects.from bridges and subways 
to public libraries. None of these ventures, 
even those that charge fees or tolls, breaks 
even. They all operate year after year in 
the red with continued public support. 
Even though there is no profit, society as a 
whole is better off when these projects are 
undertaken. Economists call the societal 
benefit in excess of cost, surplus. A closer 
look at this concept and its flip side, dead-
weight loss, provides important insights 
into the inefficiencies of the current schol-
arly journal system and the policy dilem-
mas we face in trying to change it. It is im-
portant here to keep two issues distinct. 
The first is the amount of surplus, and the 
second is who gets it. We need to consider 
both the size of the pie and how the pieces 
are divided. 
l!i- There are two types of surplus, pro-
ducer surplus and consumer surplus. Pro-
ducer surplus i~ the easier to understand. 
It is the difference between the cost of pro-
ducing and the revenue received; it is the 
producer's economic profit or loss. 9 In our 
example, at marginal cost pricing the pro-
ducer surplus is negative. Consumer sur-
plus is less clear-cut. It is the difference be-
tween the demand curve and the con-
sumer's cost for the product. One way to 
trunk about this is to consider the one li-
brary subscriber who is willing to pay $250 
for our sample journal and assume that 
this $250 is reflective of the value this jour-
nal has to the library. But because the price 
is based on marginal cost, the library is 
only charged $10. The difference, $240, is 
the measure of benefit the library receives 
but for which it does not pay. If we look at 
all the consumers who place a value on the 
journal above the price they are charged, 
we have the total consumer surplus. In 
our example, at marginal cost pricing, this 
is the shaded area in figure 4. By compar-
ing figure 3 and figure 4, it should be clear 
that the negative producer surplus of 
$10,,000 is offset by a larger consumer sur-
plus. This surplus turns out to be $32, 175. 
In our example, even though there is a loss 
to the publisher, society as a whole bene-
fits. The measure of this benefit is the total 
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surplus of $22,175. As it turns out, mar-
ginal cost pricing creates the greatest total 
surplus. This is why the quantity pro-
duced at this point is called the efficient 
quantity. 
This general principle explains bridges 
and subways. But scholarly journals are 
different. Public works are provided by a 
government. Put simply, the govern-
ment's role is to collect enough money in 
tax dollars from those who receive the 
benefit, or society at large, to make up for 
the loss in providing the good. The gov-
ernment is the transfer agent that makes it 
possible for a natural monopoly to operate 
with marginal cost pricing. To the extent 
that universities and scholarly societies 
publish scholarly journals, they can play 
this role. Grant-supported page charges 
are another subsidy mechanism.10 But 
where commercial firms dominate the 
scholarly journal system, the operation 
functions largely without a transfer agent. 
Before we end our consideration of sur-
plus, we need to introduce another 
concept-deadweight loss. Deadweight 
loss is the measure of lost societal benefit, 
that is,. of how much the pie has shrunk. 
To calculate the amount of deadweight 
loss, we begin with the amount of surplus 
at marginal cost pricing and then subtract 
the amount of surplus under another pric-
ing scheme. The result is deadweight loss. 
DUAL PRICING 
As we have seen, it is a losing proposi-
tion for a private firm to produce a schol-
arly journal and sell it at or near marginal 
cost. Therefore, it is easy to understand 
why publishers look for alternatives. One 
option in a market like that of the scholarly 
journal is price discrimination. Librarians 
usually refer to this practice as dual pric-
ing. 
Producers can discriminate on the basis 
of price if they have monopoly power, if 
there are two or more distinct segments of 
the market with different demands, and if 
it is possible to restrict deals between the 
two groups. The scholarly journal market 
meets these conditions. There are two 
market segments with different demand 
functions and resale deals are limited. 
Ironically, it is libraries that create the 
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greatest barriers to deal making. Library 
procedures and the need for reliable re-
ceipts make deals difficult, and operating 
efficiencies are. usually considered more 
important than the savings on subscrip-
tion prices. 
To show how price discrimination 
might work, consider a publisher who 
uses marginal pricing for individuals, 
charging them $10. But this publisher has 
decided to charge libraries $100 for a sub-
scription (see figure 5). At a subscription 
price of $100, there will be 150 library sub-
scriptions. As before, an individual ~ub­
scription price of $10 will bring 450 per-
sonal subsciptions. There will be a total of 
600 subscriptions ... 90 fewer than. with mar-
ginal cost pricing. All of the lost subcrip-
tions come from the library market. The 
production costs are $16 ,000 and revenues 
are $19,500. The publisher earns a profit of 
$3,500 and substantially improves the 
long-term prospects of the journal. The 
consumer surplus is $14,625, much less 
than under marginal cost pricing, but the 
producer surplus has risen by $13,500, 
from negative $10,000 to $3,500. The total 
surplus is $18,125, and deadweight loss is 
$4,050 or about 18 percent. 
A variation of this pricing scheme is 
worth noting. Assume the publisher is a 
scholarly society with a goal of maximiz-
ing the number of individual subscrip-
tions and with a need only to break even 
financially. The price of the journal for in-
dividuals could be cut in half, to $5, and if 
the $100 library rate was maintained, costs 
would just be covered. There would be 
750 subscriptions: 600 to individuals, 150 
more than with the $10 price, and 150 sub-
scriptions to libraries. Costs would be 
$17,500 and revenues would be $18,000. 
The producer surplus would be $500. The 
consumer surplus would be $17,250 and 
the total surplus $17,750. The deadweight 
loss would be $4,425. This situation is in-
teresting because while consumer surplus 
is increased, and it might be argued that 
society is better off because the knowledge 
contained in the journal is more widely 
distributed, the deadweight loss is greater 
than when the individual price is set at $10 
and there are 150 fewer individual sub-
scribers. 
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If, on the other hand, the goal of the 
publisher is to maximize profits, prices 
would be set differently. A monopolist 
seeking to maximize profit will produce 
the quantity where the marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost. That is, where the 
costs of producing the last item is equal to 
the revenue earned on the last sale. If this 
is done in the two markets, the library 
price would be set at $135, which would 
bring 115 library subscriptions. The indi-
vidual subscription price would be set at 
$22.50 and there would be 75 individual 
subscribers. 11 There would be a total of 190 
subscriptions; cost would be $11, 900 and 
revenues would be $17,212.50. The pub-
lisher would realize an economic profit of 
$5,312.50, which is also the producer sur-
plus. The consumer surplus w9uld be 
$7,893.75 for a total surplus of $13,206.25. 
There would be a deadweight loss of 
$8, 968, a full 40 percent. From the point of 
view of the consumer and of society at 
large, this is the worst case we have yet 
considered, but it is the best for the pub-
lisher. 12 The alternative pricing strategies, 
the quantities produced in the two mar-
kets, and the profits that result are shown 
in table 2. Table 3 shows the surplus gen-
erated in each case. 
If we take a broad view of the process of 
scholarly communication, we might find 
the first two examples of price discrimina-
tion acceptable. Libraries subsidize indi-
viduals, but the result is a widely distrib-
uted journal that has the wherewithall to 
continue on sound financial footing. 13 In 
the latter case, we would probably react 
differently. Again libraries provide the 
means to make the journal successful, but 
this time, rather than achieving the broad 
distribution of scholarship, only a few can 
afford to subscribe. The benefit of the en-
terprise goes to the publisher, not to the 
academic community. There are indica-
tions that both strategies are used by 
scholarly journal publishers. Dyl' s study 
of business and economics journals found 
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that private publishers were more likely to 
discriminate and that their price differen-
tials were greater than university presses' 
or professional associations1 • 14 A broader 
and more systematic study by Patrick 
Joyce and Thomas Merz found similar 
results across a number of d.isciplines. 15 
THE DILEMMA 
What is important to note from these ex-
amples is that it is the goals of the pub-
lisher and the way in which the price dis-
crimination is applied that should concern 
us, not simply the fact of price discrimina-
tion. When we look at price discrimination 
we must be clear about what our goals are 
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10,100 1,010 
10,250 410 
10,500 210 
11,500 77 
12,500 50 
15,000 30 
20,000 20 
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10 
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10 
10 
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for the scholarly journal system before we 
leap to judgment. We may wish to maxi-
mize total surplus or to maximize con-
sumer surplus. H we hold stock in the 
publishing company, we may wish to 
maximize producer surplus. A position on 
the middle ground would be to maximize 
the amount of surplus that at the same 
time allows publishers to stay in business. 
We need also to understand that because 
we are dealing with a natural monopoly, 
and because many producers are private 
firms, we cannot have it all at once. The 
market does not have the means to make 
the transfers necessary both to maximize 
surplus and to maintain viable private 
publishing ventures. This is the funda-
mental cause of the scholarly journal di-
lemma. 
X-INEFFICIENCY 
While there are clear examples of jour-
nal publishers who are in the market to 
maximize profits, it is equally clear that 
there are many who have more noble 
ends. But even those who are primarily 
concerned with the wide distribution of 
scholarly information are affected by mar-
TABLE2 
PRICING STRATEGIES, SUBSCRIPTION LEVELS, AND RESULTING PROBTS 
Marginal Dual Dual Dual 
Cost Price Price Price 
Price One• Two Three 
Cost to libraries $10 $100 $100 $135 
No. of library subscriptions 240 150 150 115 
Revenue from libraries $2,400 $15,000 $15,000 $15,525 
Cost to individuals $10 $10 $5 $22.50 
No. of individual subs~tions 450 450 600 75 
Revenue from individu s $4,500 $4,500 $3,000 $1,687.50 
Total subscriptions 690 600 750 190 
Total revenue $6,900 $19,500 $18,000 $17,212.50 
Total costs $16,900 $16,000 $17,500 $11,900 
Profit -$10,000 $3,500 $500 $5,312.50 
TABLE3 
PRICING STRATEGIES AND RESULTING SURPLUS 
Marginal Dual Dual Dual 
Cost Price Price Price 
Price One Two Three 
Consumer surhlus $32,175 $14,625 $17,250 $7,893.75 
Producer surp us -$10,000 $3,500 $500 $5,312.50 
Total surplus $22,175 $18,125 $17,750 $13,206.25 
Deadwei3ht loss $4,050 $4,425 $8,968.75 
% of dea weight loss 18% 20% 40% 
ket conditions. In exploring how this is so, 
it is useful to employ the economic con-
cept of x-inefficency. X-inefficiency results 
when a product is produced at greater 
than least possible cost. This occurs when 
a firm has monopoly power and in the 
usual example is caused by managers who 
give themselves unnecessary perquisites 
such as expensive lunches or mahogany 
desks :in comer offices. As we have al-
ready noted, scholarly journals, at least in 
the library market, have considerable mo-
nopoly power, but as we have noted, most 
scholarly editors and authors work for lit-
tle or no pay. 'Where then are the unneces-
sary perquisites? We must look more 
closely at the goals of scholarly publish-
ing. 
One purpose of the scholarly journal is 
the distribution of scholarly information 
and, through libraries, the creation of an 
archive of the cumulative knowledge of 
humankind. But there is a second and, to 
many~ more important purpose. As we 
Price 
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briefly noted previously, publishing is one 
of the primary means by which scholars 
achieve the recognition of their peers. This 
recognition in turn brings promotion, ten-
ure, and financial rewaxd. It is this latter 
purpose that provides the incentive for x-
inefficiency. 
There is no question that scholars are 
pressured to publish., nor is there much 
doubt that a sizable proportion of this 
publication is redundant or of less than 
outstanding quality. Many decry the situ-
ation, but it continues and, if anything, 
grows worse. How can this be given refer-
eeing systems and peer review? The an-
swer is simple. The same inelastic demand 
for scholarly journals in the library market 
that can allow a profit-maximizing pub-
lisher to reap large profits allows an editor 
who wishes to maximize the number of 
papers published in his o:r her journal to 
do so. Profits do not go to the bank; rather 
they are used to increase the size of the 
journal. The larger journal provides more 
250 
X· Inefficiency 
188 2so 130 ~so • 
1 aa Quantity 
• Consumer Surplus B Partial Deadwelght Loss 
• Oeadwelght Loss 
FIGURE6 
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academic prestige; the editor can publish 
more papers by friends, former students, 
or simply those who share his or her aca-
demic views. The result is larger, higher-
priced journal with a smaller distribu-
tion.16 To the established scholars who 
manage much of the journal system, it is 
the journal's role as bestower of academic 
recognition that is paramount, not its role 
as distributor of scholarly information. For 
the latter, the established scholar relies on 
other means: conferences, preprints, and 
a network of colleagues. 
To illustrate, consider the library market 
for our sample journal. We showed that 
the break-even poin~ was at a price of $64 
where 186 subscriptions would be sold. 
There was no producer surplus and the 
consumer surplus was $17,298. We will 
use these figures as a base point. Consider 
now that rather than charging $64 the edi-
tor decides to print more pages, and to do 
so raises the price to $120. This change in 
turn leads to 130 subscriptions. Again 
there is no producer surplus and th~ con-
sumer surplus is now $7,800. The dead-
weight loss is $9,498. Figure 6 illustrates 
the situation. But something is not quite 
right. Deadweight loss implies that soci-
ety has lost, but in this case at least some of 
the surplus that we have counted as lost 
has gone to the editor and the authors. 
This is the darkly shaded area in figure 6. 
Not all of this benefit was lost, but because 
some of the articles are marginal, this is 
clearly not the best way for society to use 
its resources. The black area is different; 
this is deadweight loss, plain and simple, 
as a result of 56 libraries not purchasing 
the inflated journal. 
THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
So far we have looked at the formal sys-
tem of scholarly communication and have 
seen that it is a natural monopoly that pro-
duces far from the efficient quantity. Soci-
ety as a whole seems to be a big loser. Why 
then is it only librarians, and to a lesser ex-
tent publishers, who are up in arms? The 
answer is obvious. Most scholars operate 
largely outside the formal market. Their 
transactions are underground; that is, 
scholars rely on personal networks, the in-
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visible college, to provide much of the in-
formation they need. This network has a 
different· set of demand and production 
functions, and different prices are faced 
by the individuals in it. For scholars, sub-
scriptions are only one means of adding 
journal articles to their personal collec-
tions. Often they receive preprints or re-
prints from colleagues. They can always 
go to their local library and make a copy of 
the required articl~, or more likely, they 
can send a graduate student. It is impor-
tant to note that in both of these cases the 
prices faced by the scholar are different 
from those of subscribing to the journal. 
The price paid by the scholar is the time 
spent writing for the reprint or going to 
the library to search out the article and a 
few nickels for the photocopier. 
The only costs the scholar faces are mar-
ginal costs. The up-front costs are not con-
sidered. Copyright, the mechanism•that is 
meant to provide the publisher a return on 
investment to cover first-copy costs, is ig-
nored. Copying practices have been justi-
fied by the doctrine of fair use. For the 
scholar, the journal system is like a public 
works project. Scholarly societies and uni-
versity libraries finance the system much 
the way the government finances bridges. 
In doing so, they create a public good that 
is scholars' to use at will. Scholars work in 
ways that mitigate the dysfunctions of the 
above-ground scholarly journal market. 
The important question is whether the 
inefficiencies of the current system-the 
combination of high journal prices and the 
underground acquisition of journal arti-
cles by scholars-are great enough that so-
ciety would be better off providing the 
subsidy necessary to price the journal at 
marginal cost in the first place. There is no 
easy way to know, but clearly the costs of 
using university libraries can be great in 
both time and trouble; this part of.the un-
derground economy is expensive. Most 
studies of document availability indicate 
that the average user of an academic li-
brary has only a 50 to 60 percent chance of 
finding the item for which he or she is 
searching .17 Even though scholars have 
made adaptations that may help them in 
using it, the scholarly journal system as it 
exists today is far from efficient. 
"'What is important to note from 
these examples is that it is the goals of 
the publisher and the way in which 
the price discrimination is applied 
that should concern us, not simply 
the fact of price discrimination.'' 
WILL ELECTRONIC 
SYSTEMS HELP? 
Our understanding of the economics of 
the scholarly journal is important when 
we look toward the future, for there seems 
to be a comm.on assumption among librar-
ians that the advent of electronic scholarly 
communication will solve the scholarly 
journal problem. John Lubans, Jr., is typi-
cal when he,writes: 
In my simple thesis, electronic journals mean 
that libraries would no longer pay an up-front 
subscription cost: we would pay as we use the 
information in publishers" data banks. Consid-
ering the cost of computer inputting and. stor-
age, it is unlikely that publishers would main-
tain extensive back files or uinventories1 ' • • • 
Furthermore, publishers might even be 
motivated to "publish" only genuinely new in-
formation and reject that which does not make 
an obvious contribution. 18 
After contemplating his vision, how-
ever, Lubans comes to the conclusion that 
there will be few gains. "'Ultimately, elec-
tronic publishing may enable us to make 
gains in space, but not in budgets; pub-
lishers will not give up earnings regard-
less of how many fewer 'pages' they ma~ 
"publish' in some giant computer." 9 
While the pipe dream of the great data-
base in the sky and the .cynical view of the 
forever exploited are easy answers, they 
both ignore the fundamental economics of 
the distribution of scholarship. 
What can we say about the economics of 
electronic information? To begin with, on-
line systems, at least as they are currently 
conceived, will have a cost structure simi-
lar to that of scholarly journals. The up-
front fixed costs to do the editorial work 
and promotion will remain but are likely 
to decrease as authors provide copy in 
machine-readable forms. In addition, 
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there are fixed costs of maintaining the 
distribution system, the computer, and 
the communication network. The variable 
costs associated with the production of 
each unit of output will likely be less than 
the printing and distribution of a journal 
issue today. At most, the cost will be a few 
seconds of central processing unit (CPU) 
time and communication costs. Like 
scholarly journals, online information sys-
tems will be natural monopolies. The only 
way that a private firm will be able to exist 
in this environment will be to charge 
prices well above the efficient price and 
thus limit access to the few who are willing 
to pay a great deal. There may, however, 
be opportunities to improve the situation. 
As editorial costs fall, the amount of sub-
sidy required to produce at the efficient 
quantity also falls. More importantlyJ uni-
versities already possess large computers 
and support communications networks. 
Such support constitutes an easy and ef-
fective subsidy. 
The expectations of users of electronic 
systems will also change; scholars will see 
only the small marginal cost, not the up-
front cost. They may not understand why 
online access to commercial information is 
expensive. In an electronic environment 
the marginal cost of distributing scholarly 
information may approach zero, and 
scholars might expect that the access to 
this information should be provided as a 
public good. They will want access to the 
whole universe of knowledge through 
their personal computers. 
Another predictable effect of digital in-
formation will be that the underground in-
formation economy will be even more 
widespread than it is today. As Theodor 
Nelson, the father of hypertext, has said: 
Once material goes out to the user, there is no 
telling what becomes of it. The user may read it 
on a screen, print it out or save it on a disk, and 
there is no reasonable way of preventing this or 
telling that he has done so. Thus we must live 
with the fact that there is no controlling; the out-
put, or its use, once it exits the wire.2 
This prospect frightens publishers, and 
their fears may be justified. In the past, 
copyright has provided exclusive rights 
that have allowed publishers to recover 
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their up-front costs. When copying be-
comes impossible to stop, copyright will 
be less important a protection for intellec-
tual property than restricted access. But 
can any reasonable restriction be effec-
tive? After all, the point is to sell informa-
tion, not to horde it. The ease with which 
digital information of all types can be re-
produced suggests that if high prices for 
information continue in the legitimate 
marketplace, an underground electronic 
information economy will flourish. 
Another scenario suggests . that pub-
lishers and libraries may not be necessary. 
A scholar-to-scholar network that com-
bmes electronic mail and bulletin boards 
may create a wired version of the invisible 
college. In the extreme case, each scholar 
becomes his or her own publisher; they 
pay the cost of putting their own material 
onto the network and they receive royal-
ties directly each time their material is 
used. The costs of computers and com-
munications will still need to be paid~ but 
as noted, subsidy mechanisms already ex-
ist. Although there is concern about refer-
eeing in such a system, it is easy to imag-
ine a system that would incorporate peer 
review. 
Electronic media may lower production 
prices and to some extent cut publishers 
and libraries out of the loop, but the real 
advantage of electronic systems will be to 
allow institutions to create marginal prices 
for their members by subsidizing informa-
tion services internally. In its electronic 
from, scholarly publishing remains a nat-
ural monopoly, and especially when com-
mercial firms are the producers, pricing 
and distribution patterns will be similar to 
those of the scholarly journal. What 
changes with electronic information is 
that subsidy mechanisms are much easier 
to implement. A library, if it chooses, will 
be able to redistribute the information 
within its parent organization at the mar-
ginal price. The trick for libraries has al-
ways been to find the means to acquire ex-
pensive information and to make it widely 
available to its users at a low cost in both 
time, trouble, and dollars. In a paper 
world this was a difficult, if not impos-
sible,, task. In an electronic world the task 
is much easier to imagine. It will require 
November 1989 
the development of a technical infrastruc-
ture, the negotiation of redistribution ar-
rangements with publishers, and the de-
velopment of internal pricing structures 
and accounting systems; while difficult, 
all of these requirements are possible. 
CHOICES 
As is often the case, understanding the 
economics of a problem does not provide 
easy answers; rather, it clarifies the alter-
natives. There will still be conflicting inter-
ests and different beneficiaries of different 
policies. But at least we have a better idea 
of what the choices are and where the ben-
efits fall. As we have seen, the distribution 
of scholarship is a natural monopoly. This 
means that unless there is a subsidy, the 
system will not work efficiently. There are 
,then, two important questions. First, is in-
formation distribution important enough 
tojustifythesubsidy? Andifitis, how and 
~to whom is the subsidy provided? If we 
answer the first question affirmatively, we 
will confront political battles that can only 
be won if we have carefully considered 
our answer to the second question. 
Even if libraries make considerable 
changes in their demand for scholarly 
journals, which is unlikely in the short 
term, the production function of scholarly 
information will mean that the market 
structure and prices will remain much as 
they are pow. The most efficient solution 
is to provide subsidies for the distribution 
of scholarship, but without fundamental 
changes in government information pol-
icy this will not happen. In a paper system 
there are ways to reduce the cost of distrib-
uting information within an organization. 
We can make libraries easier to use or pro-
vide document delivery and selective dis-
semination of information services. But 
because print is by nature cumbersome to 
copy, and because copyright issues are 
still largely unsettled, the possibilities are 
limited. 
Electronic information will provide 
greater opportunities for organizations to 
redistribute information internally. Sub-
sidy mechanisms will be much easier to 
implement so that surplus inside the orga-
nization can be maximized. The acquisi-
tions of funds for subsidizing information 
services-the tax problem-will remain a 
difficult task. The argument that needs to 
be made is one of increasing institutional 
surplus through a subsidy to information 
infrastructure and services. The impor-
tance ot the natural monopoly model of 
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scholarly communication is that it makes 
the benefits of such an investment clear. If 
we fail to make this case, we may end up 
perpetuating the inefficiencies of the 
scholarly journal. 
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